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ABSTRACT 
This paper looked into inter- relationships between Regional Integration 
Agreement (RIA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from theoretical point of 
view. It tried to figure out the conducts of FDI after the formation of RIA from 
intra- regional and inter- regional perspective. The theoretical framework was 
developed from the cross- section tabulation of motives and modes of FDI. It is 
identified that multinationals have two basic rationales for their motives of 
investment abroad: tariff- jumping and internalization. Further, they conduct their 
decision of FDI through two modes: vertical and horizontal FDI. To study the 
distribution of FDI in individual economy after RIA, the study of “Attractiveness 
matrix” was carried out. It suggested that the flow of FDI depends upon the 
consequences of “Environmental change” and “Locational advantage” of the host 
economies within the region. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past three decades, an increase in the number and depth of Regional 
Integration Agreements (RIA) around the world has taken place quite remarkably 
accelerating the movement of production factors across international boundaries 
(OECD, 2001). The former European Economic Community has advanced into a 
single market European Union (EU) and has also successfully adopted a common 
currency, Euro. In America, a number of agreements have been either created (e.g. 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR) or strengthened in the 1990s. Likewise, countries in 
Southeast Asia have adopted the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). On a broader 
East Asian outlook, ASEAN plus three (Japan, China and Korea) or ASEAN plus 
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three plus three (India, Australia, New Zealand) is getting prominence (ADB, 
2008). However, it is to be noted that the nature of FDI and RIA that takes place 
between the “developed- developed” nations differs from that taking place 
between “developed-developing” nations and “developing-developing” nations 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, the increasing importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
relative to other forms of international capital flow has resulted in the increased 
production of world output (Hagen and Zhang, 2009). The world has been 
experiencing a dramatic surge in the flows of FDI with comparison to world trade. 
The surge in FDI involves flows toward both developed and developing countries 
and there is competition among emerging economies in attracting FDI. This is 
because FDI inflow brings various benefits to FDI host economies such as much 
needed capital, technology and international networks (Urata and Kawai, 2000). 
 
In the light of these two developments, the role of RIA as a determinant of the 
location of FDI has become an increasingly relevant issue. One of the 
ever-argued comments is whether RIA is compliment or supplement to FDI. And 
this particular question arouses interests of economists and policy makers. 
Though there is reason to believe that effects will vary between different 
integration agreements and between countries and industries involved in the 
agreements, some of the empirical studies have showed that these two facts are 
interlinked in many aspects. Especially, there is a dearth of concrete theoretical 
underpinning on the subject of effects of RIA on FDI after the free trade 
agreements. This paper tries to fill in that gap by exploring the RIA as the 
determinant for the location of inward FDI and effects on intra- regional and 
inter- regional FDI. Moreover, it will also try to look into the distribution and 
redistribution of FDI into the host economies after RIA takes place.  
 
Next section focuses on the literature review of the previous studies, which 
would be a founding step to formulate the theoretical framework. In section 3 we 
provide the motives and modes of FDI. Section 4 builds up the theoretical 
framework on the conducts of RIA on FDI, both in intra- region and inter- region 
level. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Considering the fact that the theory of FDI is not as advanced as that of trade, 
literature review remains the integral part of this paper in collaborating the 
concepts to develop the theoretical framework. Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) 
synthesizes that regional integration should enhance the attractiveness of 
investing in the region as a whole by creating a larger common market and 
contributing to improved overall efficiency and higher income levels in the 
market. The magnitude of the changes in investment will be related to the 
significance and nature of the trade and investment liberalization initiatives 
embodies in the RIA. Further, the relationship between RIA and FDI is powered 
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by the “Environmental change” connected with regional integration and the 
“Locational advantages” of the individual country or industry (discussed in detail 
in section 4). Stronger environmental change and locational advantage will lead 
to inflow of FDI from the outside as well as from the rest of the integrating 
region. They tested their findings in three different kinds of regional integration, 
North-North integration (CUSFTA), North- South integration (NAFTA), and 
South- South integration (MERCOSUR).The first case focused on the Canadian 
participation in the CUSFTA, which started in January 1989, and illustrated a 
situation where the RIA did not appear to cause any radical changes in the 
inflows of FDI to the country in question. Indeed, intra- regional Investment i.e. 
US investment in Canada and Canadian investment in US has actually decreased 
with the CUSFTA agreement, however there has been some increment in 
investments from outside countries.  
 
The second case examined the impact of the NAFTA agreement and suggested 
that this specific agreement has had a profound impact on the inflows of FDI in 
Mexico. The inflows of FDI have risen sharply from less than US $ 3.0 billion in 
1989 to nearly US $ 8.0 billion in 1994. The agreement contributed to very 
significant and positive environmental change, an added bonus is that these are 
likely to be perceived as more permanent improvements in the investment 
environment than purely domestic reforms. Thanks to the increasingly market 
oriented economic policies, geographical proximity, and supply of cheap labor, 
Mexico also possesses strong locational advantages with respect to its northern 
neighbors. Consequently, regional integration has created new commercial 
opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, in the domestic Mexican market 
as well as in the US and Canadian markets. The Mexican experience may capture 
some general characteristics of North-South agreements, primarily related to the 
potential for improved policy credibility and gains from guaranteed access to 
large northern markets. The third case examined the impact of MERCOSUR 
involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the Customs 
Union was formally established in the beginning of 1995, gradual liberalization 
of intra-regional trade was underway since early 1990s and most internal trade 
barriers had been removed by then. The available evidence, although patchy, 
show that a strong investment expansion has coincided with this integration 
process and it is reasonable to assume that the continuing integration process may 
stimulate further significant investment responses. Argentina and Brazil are the 
two countries with the strongest locational advantages, mainly because of 
abundant natural resources, relatively well developed industrial sectors and large 
domestic market. The two other members Paraguay and Uruguay seem to have 
relatively weak locational advantage coupled with their smaller domestic market.  
 
It is to be noted that the three cases studied in Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) are 
of different variety. The integration between two developed nations US and 
Canada showed that there is less impact of integration process in FDI citing that 
the intra- regional investment has indeed decreased in both Canada and US with 
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moderate level increment in inter- regional investment. The case of NAFTA, 
where a developing country joining the integration with the developed nations 
showed that the investment increased because it is believed that these investment 
from outsiders took place not only to cater the domestic market of Mexico but 
also in larger context to cater the larger market of US and Canada as there has 
been no formal barriers between these countries. The case of MERCOSUR 
provides us to enough evidence to support the fact that macroeconomic stability 
and locational advantages of the countries matter in attracting FDIs.  
 
In another paper by Blomstrom, Kokko and Globerman (1998), the authors have 
compared the integration effect between EU and North America and finds 
contrasting results. In particular, the North American experiences suggest 
substantially more modest impacts of trade agreements on intra- regional trade 
creation and extra-regional FDI stimulation than is associated with the EU 
experience, particularly with the earlier stages of EU liberalization. At the same 
time, the North American experiences support European findings that trade and 
investment impacts will differ across countries within the integrating region. 
 
Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2002) figured out the effects of RIA on the flow of FDI 
from the aspect of the creation of Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). Though 
the study was done to carry out the prospect of FTAA, the focus was broader 
covering the effects of RIA in general. The theoretical line of reasoning in this 
paper is to look into the effects of RIA on FDI from three different perspectives: 
from members of same RIA, from members outside of the RIA and from source 
country. The medium used for the study is a modified version of the standard 
gravity model that abstracts from most country and pair- specific aspects. They 
used dataset on bilateral outward FDI stocks from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics which covers FDI from 20 source countries, all of them 
from the OECD, to 60 host countries, from 1982 through 1998. The shortcoming 
of this data is that it does not cover FDI between developing countries. Yet, it is 
the most complete source available for bilateral FDI, which is a key ingredient to 
the study. They conclude that the estimated effect of a common FTA membership 
on the bilateral FDI stock is positive and significant. Joining a FTA, on average, 
more than doubles the bilateral FDI between its members. The positive effect 
suggests that any potential loss of FDI due to the tariff- jumping argument offset 
by other effects that operate in the opposite direction. The formation of RIAs 
increases the incentives for multinational activity of the vertical variety (which 
takes advantage of differences in factor proportions), and reduces multinational 
activity of the horizontal variety, which is a substitute for trade. 
 
Kim (2000) establishes three hypotheses and conducts the study on FDI 
determinants. First, the differences on the determinants of Japanese and US 
manufacturing FDI in Europe are smaller by the impacts of European Economic 
Integration. Second, the determinants of Japanese manufacturing FDI in Europe 
has been more influenced by the strategy from resource seeking to market 
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efficiency or strategic asset seeking. And lastly, the determinants of US 
manufacturing FDI in Europe have been more influenced by European 
integration. He tested these hypotheses through generalized liner regression 
model. All of these hypotheses have been supported by his statistical analysis and 
his conclusion follows that European economic integration had influence on the 
determinants of Japanese and US manufacturing FDI in Europe from the first 
(1975-1984) to the second period (1985-1996). However, the influence of the 
integration compared to that of other variables is more critical in the case of US 
FDI rather than in the Japanese case in the second period. It could imply that 
because the United States has a long history of investment in Europe, European 
economic integration might have a greater influence on restructuring pre-existing 
FDI within Europe rather than on stimulating new FDI in the first period. On the 
contrary, because Japanese FDI in Europe began from the early 1970s and its FDI 
had aimed to exploit Europe as a whole from the beginning, the effect of 
European economic integration on Japanese manufacturing FDI was not 
significant in the first period, but in the second period.  
 
On Asian studies, Kawai and Urata (2002) noted that the remarkable economic 
growth of East Asian economies from the mid 1980s until 1996 is the result of 
various factors such as sound fundamentals, including stable macroeconomic 
environment, human capital and limited price distortions. In addition, a large 
amount of FDI inflows to East Asia, together with foreign trade, contributed to 
the region’s rapid economic growth. Economic growth in- turn generated trade 
and attracted FDI inflows. Indeed, in East Asia a virtuous cycle of rapid 
economic growth and trade- FDI expansion was behind the remarkable economic 
performance during 1990s. Although the crisis of 1997 disrupted the growth of 
these economies, FDI inflows appear to have contributed significantly to 
mitigating the impact of the crisis and to recovering from it. Under these 
circumstances, emerging East Asian economies should continue to lower and 
remove the barriers to trade and FDI not only through global and trans-regional 
liberalization processes such as WTO and APEC, but also through regional and 
sub regional schemes such as ASEAN+3, AFTA and bilateral FTAs. 
 
UNCTAD (2003) in World Investment Report adjoins a page titling “Effects of 
regional integration agreements on FDI in Asia”, in which it takes the cases of 
ASEAN and SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 
countries after the signing of AFTA and SAPTA respectively. According to the 
page, several studies at the firm level suggest that the AFTA has influenced Trans 
National Corporations’ decisions to invest in the region, especially in the 
automotive and electronics industries. A cross- sectional regression analysis of 
US outward FDI suggested that the major ASEAN host countries (Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) received more FDI than the analysis 
predicted for 1994. This could imply positive effects of AFTA on FDI flows from 
the US. FDI flows to the ASEAN sub region have increased steadily, particularly 
after the signing of AFTA and until the 1997- 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. In the 
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SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement sub region, FDI has seen 
improvements since the signing of the agreement in 1993 (Das, 2007). 
 
3. UNDERSTANDING MOTIVES AND MODES OF FDI 
A difficulty in assessing the role of RIA on FDI is that there are many different 
channels through which RIA could potentially have an impact on the location of 
FDI and not all of them go in the same direction. The motives and modes of FDI 
plays vital role in assessing these. Moreover, the impacts of RIA on FDI are 
specifically significant on the intra- regional and inter- regional level. While with 
the changing motives and modes, FDI can bring the change in the composition of 
FDI in participating countries, the scenario may look like that some country can 
be net winner at the cost of the loser one. Therefore, to identify and assess some 
theoretical linkages between RIAs and incentives to undertake FDI, it is 
necessary to look into the motives and modes of FDI from the perspective of 
intra- regional and inter- regional. Among others, we would focus our discussion 
on the two basic theories to explain this behavior. 
 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm: One of the most significant theories that explain 
the activities of foreign firms is eclectic paradigm introduced by John H. 
Dunning (Dunning, 1971). According to him, the tendency of a firm to engage in 
foreign production depends on its OLI (Ownership, Location and Internalization) 
configuration in the target market. In its original form, the eclectic paradigm 
stated that the extent, form and pattern of international production were 
determined by the configuration of three sets of advantages as perceived by 
enterprises. First, in order for firms of one nationality to compete with those of 
another by producing in the latter are, they must possess certain advantages 
specific to the nature and/ or nationality of their Ownership. These advantages- 
sometimes called competitive or monopolistic advantages- must be sufficient to 
compensate for the costs of setting up and operating a foreign value- adding 
operation, in addition to those faced by indigenous producers or potential 
producers. The second condition for international production is that of 
internalization which says that it must be in the best interests of enterprises that 
possess ownership- specific advantages to transfer them across national 
boundaries within their own organizations rather than sell them, or their right of 
use to foreign- based enterprises.  
 
The third strand of the eclectic paradigm deals with the location. MNEs engage 
in foreign production whenever they perceive it is in their best interests to 
combine spatially transferable intermediate products produced in the home 
country with at least some immobile factor endowments or other intermediate 
products in another country. It is then the juxtaposition of the ownership- specific 
advantages of firms contemplating foreign production or an increase in foreign 
production; the propensity to internalize the cross border markets for these; and 
the attractions of a foreign location for production which is the gist of the eclectic 
paradigm of international production. The paradigm helps to explain not only 
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how regional integration changes location advantages but also how it affects the 
distribution of ownership advantages between firms of different origins and the 
configuration of both ownership and location specific advantages. 
 
UNCTAD 1998: In a neoclassical interpretation, UNCTAD reports three host 
country determinants of FDI in its publication: World Investment Report, 1998: 
Trends and Determinants. They are Policy Framework for FDI, Economic 
determinants and Business Facilitation. While the Policy Framework includes the 
factors like economic, political and social stability, international agreements, 
privatization policy, etc; Business Facilitation includes the factors like 
Investment promotion and incentives, hassle costs and after- investment services. 
The economic determinant, which is more related to the study, has been 
described briefly below. The particular economic determinants of FDI according 
to the UNCTAD depend on whether the FDI falls into one of the three categories. 
Market seeking FDI- firms that are attempting to locate facilities near large 
markets for their goods and services. Resource or asset seeking FDI- firms those 
are in search of particular natural resources or particular human skills. 
Efficiency- seeking FDI- firms that can sell their products worldwide and in 
search of location where production costs are the lowest.  
 
With these two basic theories on FDI conduction, figure 1 has been developed to 
set up the motives and modes of FDI. It shows the association of the Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm and UNCTAD’s interpretation on FDI with three additionally 
introduced variables tariff- jumping, horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. The 
objective of producing motives as tariff- jumping and internalization and modes 
as horizontal and vertical FDI is to arrange the concept of FDI Inflow in simple 
and explainable manner so as to have convincing analysis on the effects of RIA. 
It should be noted that all the characteristics of both the theories have been taken 
care by the motives and modes as in the figure. Rest of the analysis on the effects 
of RIA on FDI is based upon these motives and modes. Following sub- sections 
are dedicated for that purpose. 
 
3.1 Motives of FDI: Tariff- jumping and Internalization 
The motives of FDI tries to answer the “why” question, i.e. why are 
multinationals interested in investing and producing abroad rather than producing 
domestically and exporting to outside markets. The early theoretical and 
empirical literature on FDI tended to regard trade and capital movements as 
substitutable modes of serving foreign markets. This view of the relationship 
between trade and factor mobility suggests that tariff barriers could motivate 
import-substituting FDI, and that general tariff reductions would reduce FDI 
flows. Thus, with the argument of tariff- jumping, the formation of RIA would 
reduce FDI. This means that with no formal trade barriers in place, the 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) would like to produce domestically and serve 
the foreign market by exporting the goods. It is especially true in the scenario of 
intra- regional investments (investments taking place between and within the 
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members of the integrated region) once the economies enter into formal trading 
agreements. On the contrary, it is also true that if the integrated region as a whole 
remains substantial trade barriers with outside world and free trade within 
members, this argument will actually give rise to inter- regional investments 
(investments that coming from non- member countries to integrated region). 
Figure 1: Generalization of Motives and Modes of FDI 
 
 
However, although much FDI is motivated by tariff-jumping arguments, there are 
cases when FDI have taken place with the motive of the exploitation of 
intangible assets. In order to compete successfully in a foreign market - where 
local firms have superior knowledge of the local market, consumer preferences, 
and business practices - the internationally oriented firm must possess some 
firm-specific intangible asset, such as technological and marketing expertise, 
brand image, etc. that gives it a competitive edge. In order to exploit these firm 
specific intangible assets, multinationals require to “internalizing” by 
establishing its affiliates or subsidiaries, since other modes of international 
business, including exports and licensing carry relatively high transaction costs. 
Therefore FDI is expected to occur even when there are no formal trade barriers 
between countries. And, RIA hardly matter for these types of FDIs. But, it is 
comprehensible from the literatures that investors prefer to have barrier free 
world. 
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As per the relationship in figure 1 is concerned, it can be noted that tariff- 
jumping argument holds the characteristics of the Market- seeking FDI. As 
discussed earlier, inter- regional investment tends to increase with enlarged 
market via RIA and substantial tariff barrier in place for outside world. 
Internalization caters to the two characteristics of eclectic paradigm- ownership 
and internalization. 
 
3.2 Modes of FDI: Vertical FDI and Horizontal FDI 
The modes of FDI give the answer of “how”, i.e. how do the multinationals 
expand their investments with specific motive in mind. This view provides good 
insight whether FDI and trade are complements or substitutes. Vertical FDI takes 
place when a firm geographically fragments production by stages, in order to 
take advantage of location-specific advantages such as lower factor prices. An 
implication of this model is that one would only expect to observe this type of 
FDI taking place between countries with sufficiently different factor endowments, 
so as to ensure that factor prices do not equalize (Yeyati, Stein and Daude, 2002). 
FDI and trade are complements if a MNE relocates part of its production chain, 
e.g. its labor intensive assembly plant, to a low-wage country, exports 
headquarter services such as blueprints and management skills, and intermediate 
inputs to that country, and then re-exports final goods. Imports of the ‘home’ 
country increase as it imports products made by the foreign subsidiary, while its 
exports increase because the foreign subsidiary requires capital and intermediate 
goods from home. This theory suggests that FDI tend to take place no matter of 
RIA’s effect and locational advantage is the factor that becomes the essential 
concern (Caves, 1996). 
 
Horizontal FDI takes place when a MNE produces the same goods and services 
in multiple countries, in order to avoid the ‘trade costs’ of exporting goods, but 
wishing to exploit its firm-specific advantages in production. Each production 
facility supplies the domestic market. A key assumption in the horizontal model 
is the presence of economies of scale at the level of the firm, which is the source 
of the advantage of multinational firms over domestic ones. Multinational 
activity in the horizontal model depends on the interplay between trade costs and 
plant-level economies of scale. With trade liberalization, trade costs will come 
down, and the incentive to produce in multiple country locations will diminish, 
particularly if there are significant economies of scale. In this case FDI and trade 
are substitutes. Therefore, in the absence of trade costs i.e. the formation of 
integration, there would be no reason for multinational production, since firms 
could concentrate their production in the home country, taking advantage of 
economies of scale and serving the foreign market through trade. As trade costs 
increase, multinational production arises as long as plant-level economies of 
scale are not too high (Caves, 1996).  
 
Figure 1 provides the association of these two important concepts of FDI with 
that of Dunning’s and UNCTAD. As mentioned above, locational advantage is 
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the central focus for vertical FDIs to occur while Efficiency seeking and 
Resource seeking FDIs also fall into vertical category. On the other hand, 
horizontal FDIs take place when there is a motive for market seeking. As the 
integration makes the market of integrated market bigger, there are plenty 
reasons for multinationals to cater this enlarged market. 
 
4. RIA VIS-À-VIS FDI: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The effects that are discussed on motives, namely tariff- jumping and 
internalization and modes, namely, vertical and horizontal FDI, will lay down the 
basis for us to figure out the effects of RIA on the behavior of FDI. We will 
conduct the analysis with two aspects: intra- regional and inter- regional, which 
will help us in generating the rigorous behavior of FDI. A discussion will also be 
made regarding the distribution of FDI in individual countries later on this 
section. 
 
Firstly, we will look into the conduct of FDI prior to the formation of RIA as 
shown in table 1. With tariff- jumping motive, there will not be any vertical type 
of FDI taking place however, horizontal FDI do occur in both the cases of tariff- 
jumping and internalization. And, the internalization effects may depend on the 
nature of product to vertical FDI to take place. Nevertheless, the pattern of FDI 
will behave differently once the countries enter into the integration agreements as 
the RIA will eliminate the tariff barrier (and most likely non- tariff barriers too 
depending upon the nature of the agreement) among the members of Integration 
while maintaining their tariff with the outside world, which can be common or 
country- specific. 
Table 1: Conducts of FDI before RIA 
Modes 
Motives 
Vertical FDI Horizontal FDI 
Tariff- jumping Does not take place Takes place 
Internalization Depends upon nature 
of product 
Takes place 
 
This matrix could be effectively used for the identification of the effects of RIA 
that impacts FDI after the region bind into formal trading agreements. The effects 
are analyzed from the aspects of intra- regional and inter- regional. 
 
4.1 Effects of RIA on Intra- regional FDI 
The two views of the motives for FDI give partly contradictory predictions 
regarding the effects of regional integration for intra- regional investment flows. 
Regarding tariff-jumping FDI, we would primarily expect reduced investment 
flows because trade liberalization makes exporting from the home country 
relatively more attractive than FDI as a way to serve the regional market. 
However, RIA would not create incentives to reduce investment or repatriate 
capital for projects that were primarily undertaken to internalize the exploitation 
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of intangible assets. In fact, the reduction of regional trade barriers could instead 
stimulate overall FDI flows among the relevant trading partners by enabling 
MNEs to operate more efficiently across international borders. This argument 
applies in particular for vertically integrated FDI, where the operations of the 
MNEs different affiliates are specialized according to the locational advantages 
of the host country, and where a predictable and liberal trade environment is a 
prerequisite for the international division of labor at the firm level. Table 2 gives 
the framework of the mechanism of intra- regional FDI that takes place after 
RIA. 
Table 2: Conducts of Intra- regional FDI after RIA 
Modes 
Motives 
Vertical FDI Horizontal FDI 
Tariff- jumping No effect Decrease 
Internalization Increase Mixed effects-most 
likely increase 
 
There will not be any effect in the vertical FDI with tariff- jumping motive. New 
investments will hardly take place and the pre- existent investments will also 
have no impact because these investments are not concerned with changes in 
tariff. However, pre- existent horizontal FDIs may tend to decrease, or even 
disinvestments may take place, with barrier free region as the firms now find 
themselves better in serving the region by domestic production. The cross- 
section of internalization argument and vertical FDI will give rise to FDI and 
much more depends upon the locational advantage of host country. As the firms 
no more face any barrier, MNEs will be happier than before to invest utilizing its 
available resources. On the other hand, the cross- section of internalization and 
horizontal FDI will have the mixed effect but most likely to increase. Reasons for 
it being that the pre- existent investments will not change however, if the firms 
internalization advantage is strong enough, the investments do take place. 
Hence, the static effects on intra- regional FDI flows are subject to partially 
off-setting influences, and the net impact on any specific RIA or individual 
member country would tend to be determined by the structure of and motives for 
pre-existing investment. A reasonable generalization, however, is that countries 
with low initial trade restrictions are more likely to benefit from increased intra- 
regional FDI flows as trade barriers are reduced, since they are not very likely to 
host import-substituting FDI projects that might be withdrawn.  
 
4.2 Effects of RIA on Inter- regional FDI 
Turning to inter- regional FDI flows, both the tariff- jumping and internalization 
suggests increased investment flows in both vertical and horizontal modes. The 
inflows of FDI from “outsiders” into the region would go up if the average level 
of protection increases as a result of the RIAs, or if the establishment of a RIA 
raises fears about future protection. Another strong reason for this situation is 
because of the enlarged market. The inflows of foreign capital would increase if 
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the volume of incoming FDI were initially restricted by the limited size of the 
individual national markets. Contrary to the national markets, the integrated 
“common market” may be large enough to bear the fixed costs for the 
establishment of new foreign affiliates. This surge of inward FDI would probably 
not be evenly distributed, but rather concentrated to the geographical areas with 
the strongest locational advantages. Table 3 outlines the mechanism of inter- 
regional FDI that takes place after RIA. 
Table 3: Conducts of Inter- regional FDI after RIA 
Modes 
Motives 
Vertical FDI Horizontal FDI 
Tariff- jumping Increase Increase 
Internalization Increase Increase 
 
Vertical FDIs will increase with tariff- jumping motive because the outside 
investors can take advantage of country- specific resource, which was initially 
not catered due to limited market. As for horizontal FDI, the average protection 
level of the region as a whole will encourage multinationals to invest in the 
region, more importantly dealing with large market. Moreover, companies with 
internalization advantage would be willing to invest with both modes of vertical 
and horizontal FDI. Hence, in contrast to intra- regional effects, it is easy to 
determine in the case of inter- regional investment, that with the formulation of 
integration agreement, the region will enjoy the increase in FDI.  
 
4.3 Effects of RIA on Total FDI 
With the analysis of these two perspective of FDI effects on hand, we can reach 
to the generalization that the total FDI in the region will depend upon the 
intensity and the mix of investment coming from inside and outside of region. 
Clearly, if the inter- regional investment has domination over intra- regional 
investment, comprehending the effects on inter- regional FDI after RIA, we can 
make a rational assertion that the total FDI in the integrated region will increase. 
On the other hand, if the intra- regional FDI was far higher than inter- regional 
FDI, the effect could be negative.  
 
4.4 Distribution and Redistribution of FDI 
As discussed above, not all the countries would benefit from the increase in FDI. 
Even participating in the same RIA, some economies may entertain more FDI 
flowing in while some may have to satisfy with less FDI or even disinvestments. 
For any individual country, the overall impact on investment will therefore reflect 
potentially offsetting influences. However, a reasonable generalization is that 
regional integration should enhance the attractiveness of investing in the region 
as a whole by creating a larger common market and contributing to improved 
overall efficiency and higher income levels in that market. The magnitude of the 
changes in investment will be related to the significance and nature of the trade 
and investment liberalization initiatives embodied in the RIA. 
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Attractiveness Matrix in following figure (Adopted from Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1997. Original source: Globerman and Schwindt, 1996) provides an 
organizational template for thinking about the FDI process in the context of 
regional integration and it will help explain us why the economies involved in the 
integration attracts more FDI than other. 
Figure 2: Attractiveness Matrix 
 Locational Advantage (Positive to Negative →) 
Environmental Change 
(Strong to weak ↓) 
1 2 
3 4 
 
Environmental change is the degree to which trade and investment barriers are 
liberalized by the integration agreements in question. The simplest way to 
understand this feature is that it is the impact of integration agreement that the 
change in openness brought in by. In other words, environmental change is the 
degree of openness or the degree of trade and investment liberalization resulted 
due to agreement for individual countries. This implies that countries which had 
higher barriers before the agreement will benefit the most after the barriers would 
be liberalized via agreement. This depends both on the nature of the specific 
agreement and the initial institutional environment in the region. Up to down 
means liberated environment to restricted environment. Locational advantage is 
the degree to which it is advantageous from a profitability standpoint to locate an 
economic activity in a particular location. This characteristic refers to overall 
advantage of specific country, such as the availability and cost of various 
production factors as well as the country’s geographic location with respect to 
major consumer markets and the general macroeconomic environment. Left to 
right means more advantageous with compared to other countries in integration 
to less advantageous. 
 
Examining the figure, the most pronounced positive impact on investment would 
presumably be experienced by those economic sectors falling into area 1. These 
activities experience the strongest degree of integration, and the country in 
question enjoys a strong locational advantage. Hence, for reasons noted earlier, 
one would anticipate relatively strong, positive capital flows from both foreign 
and domestic investors in these sectors. In area 3, the hypothesized impact on 
domestic investment is weaker, although still positive. This area contains those 
economic activities for which the country in question has a strong locational 
advantage, but for which the impact of the integration agreement is relatively 
weak. Economic integration between OECD countries, where the formal and 
informal barriers to trade and investment are relatively low already at the outset, 
can be expected to provide many examples of industries falling into this category. 
Moving to area 2, the expected impact on inward FDI is negative and the 
potential for actual disinvestment increases. Specifically, the activities in area 2 
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are strongly affected by the integration agreement, but the country in question 
suffers locational disadvantages. Many countries and industries where the bulk of 
existing FDI has been established in order to avoid trade barriers would be 
classified in this area. Finally, the impact of integration on activities in area 4 is 
likely to be small in which the country suffers a locational disadvantage and 
weak agreement influences. In other words, area 4 contains activities where 
investment decisions are not likely to be affected by the RIA. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The relation between RIA and FDI is neither self- evident nor straightforward, as 
the decision for foreign investment depends upon lots of factors including 
economic, social and political. This study focused on whether the formation of 
RIA brings into increased inflow of FDI in the integrated region from theoretical 
perspective. To generate the conceptual framework, we carried out two means. 
Firstly, available empirical studies on the subject matter were reviewed. And 
secondly, theoretical arguments were reviewed based on available literatures and 
papers. These reviews paved the road for the development of theoretical 
argument on motives- tariff- jumping and internalization; and modes- vertical 
and horizontal FDI. The cross section effects of these motives and modes were 
analyzed from intra- regional and inter- regional distribution of FDI. By this way, 
we developed a theoretical framework by examining the conducts of FDI after 
the formation of RIA from four different perspectives- motives, modes, intra- 
regional and inter- regional. Moreover, we borrowed a theoretical template as 
Attractiveness Matrix to study the distribution pattern of FDI Inflow in individual 
participating countries after RIA. We concluded following three major effects of 
RIA on FDI.  
•The formation of Regional Integration Agreement will give rise to inflow of 
FDI in integrated region in general. 
•The effect of intra- regional FDI Inflow will have mixed effect depending upon 
previously existent FDI while inter- regional FDI will increase after RIA. 
•FDI allocation will not be even in the participating countries after the formation of 
RIA. The benefits depend upon the environmental change brought in by 
openness on trade and locational advantage of the country’s geographic position 
to the consumer market. 
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